Recent publicity about "concierge physicians" has raised concerns about the potential adverse effects of allowing physicians to bill their patients for fees that are above normal copayments and insurance reimbursements. In particular, consumers who are unable to afford the additional costs of such physicians are concerned that their access to highquality medical care could be compromised. Such concerns in the context of Medicare led states and the federal government, beginning in the late 1980s, to restrict the ability of physicians to "balance bill" beneficiaries for charges in excess of the copayment and reimbursement amounts approved by Medicare. In this paper, I provide empirical evidence that this policy change resulted in an 8% reduction in out-of-pocket medical expenditures by elderly households. In spite of the change in marginal reimbursement to physicians, however, I find little evidence that the restrictions affected quantity or quality of care.
Introduction
Recent publicity about "concierge physicians," who require substantial out-of-pocket payments in excess of regular reimbursement by health insurance companies, has raised concerns about the potential adverse effects of allowing physicians to bill some of their patients for fees that are above normal reimbursement. These physicians charge annual fees in exchange for special services, such as cell-phone access to doctors, same-day appointments, and accompaniment to specialist visits. Consumers who are unable to afford the additional costs of such physicians are concerned that their access to high-quality health care could be compromised. A 2002 New York Times editorial, for example, worried that, "if a new category of 'insurance-plus' takes root, it will exacerbate what some patients and doctors already believe is a two-tier medical system."
This very concern led to one of the most important changes in the structure of the Medicare physician program since its inception. Before the late 1980s, physicians participating in Medicare could "balance bill" beneficiaries for the difference between the physician charge and Medicare's reimbursement level. In 1984, liability for balance billing was $77 per beneficiary, or about 27% of the total part B out-of-pocket liability faced by beneficiaries (Health Care Financing Review, 2000) . During the late 1980s and early 1990s, in an effort to protect beneficiaries from out-of-pocket liabilities, state and federal policies restricted the ability of physicians to balance bill Medicare beneficiaries. These restrictions, like the more recent controversy about concierge physicians, raised concerns about how balance billing-or the lack thereof-affects access to care and the quality of care provided.
Economic theory suggests that physicians could have responded to restrictions on balance billing by adjusting the quantity and/or quality of services they provided to Medicare beneficiaries. Theory does not, however, provide unambiguous predictions about the direction of the effect on physician behavior. The predictions of standard models vary, depending on whether the model incorporates quality of care as a choice variable or allows for features such as demand inducement, physician income targeting, or demand constraints.
Furthermore, empirical research on the effects of balance billing restrictions has been quite limited. The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) analyzed data from the first four states that implemented policies, but concluded that the available data covered "too short of a time to determine whether physicians modified their behavior in response to the laws" (GAO, 1989, p. 37) . In this paper, I provide new empirical evidence on physician responses to Medicare balance billing restrictions, using variation in the timing and location of restrictions to identify their effects.
I begin by quantifying the effects of balance billing restrictions on household out-ofpocket medical expenditures, using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). My analysis indicates that balance billing restrictions led to an annual decline of approximately $120 in out-of-pocket expenditures for physician services among households with elderly members.
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This decline represents an 8% reduction in overall spending for medical services among elderly households.
Next, I consider the effects of balance billing restrictions on the quantity of care received by Medicare beneficiaries. Because balance billing restrictions decreased the marginal reimbursement for providing an additional medical service to the subset of Medicare beneficiaries who were previously paying balance bills, physicians may have responded by changing the supply of care available to Medicare patients. Using data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), I find no evidence that the number of doctor visits provided to Medicare beneficiaries changed.
Since some specialties historically balance-billed Medicare beneficiaries more than others and therefore faced larger changes in marginal reimbursement than other specialties, I
also consider the impact separately by physician specialty. For example, balance bills added an average of 7.5% to the Medicare allowed charges for the services of a family practitioner, 23% for the services of an anesthesiologist, and 24% for the services of an oral surgeon in 1990 (Helbing and Petrie, 1992) . Even among specialties that had relatively high balance billing rates, however, I find little evidence of a change in the quantity of care.
To assess the effects of balance billing restrictions on the duration of doctor visits and on the type of follow-up plans, I turn to a survey of doctor visits, the National Ambulatory
Medical Care Survey (NAMCS). I interpret measures such as duration of doctor visits as
proxies for the quality of care. Balance billing restrictions have no significant impact on the duration of doctor visits, but do have a significant, negative impact on the likelihood of planning a follow-up telephone call. This result may reflect a decision by physicians to spend less time with their Medicare patients in response to balance billing restrictions.
Finally, I consider the general equilibrium effects of the restrictions in the market for physicians. Using aggregate data on the number of physicians per capita of each specialty across states and over time, I find no significant evidence that the supply of physicians declined in response to the decreased reimbursement.
In summary, the empirical results suggest that balance billing restrictions had few, if any, consequences for the quality or quantity of care to Medicare beneficiaries. The primary impact, then, was a decrease in out-of-pocket expenditures among the subset of beneficiaries who were previously paying balance bills, which was the intention of the legislation.
Nevertheless, this impact represents redistribution from physicians to Medicare beneficiaries.
The welfare implications of the policy change, then, depend on the relative incomes and importance assigned to affected physicians and affected Medicare beneficiaries in the social welfare function.
Background and Legislative History
Medicare historically reimbursed physicians for their "customary, prevailing and reasonable" fee, which meant that physicians were reimbursed by Medicare for the lower of "(1) the actual charge (the billed amount), (2) the physician's customary charge (the median charge of all charges by that physician for that service over the previous 12 months), or (3) the prevailing charge (sufficient to cover the customary charge for three out of four bills for all physicians in the geographic area)" (GAO, 1989, p. 9) . Before 1984, doctors had a choice of "accepting assignment" or not. Doctors who accepted assignment would receive 80% of the Medicare allowed charge directly from Medicare and could bill the patient for the 20% copayment, but were not permitted to balance bill. Doctors who did not accept assignment would bill the patient for the full cost of the service, including the balance bill, and the patient would be reimbursed by Medicare for 80% of Medicare's allowed charge.
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Hence, physicians who did not accept assignment were permitted to balance bill, but ran the risk of receiving no payment for any of their charges. In contrast, physicians who did accept assignment were guaranteed payment of at least 80% of the Medicare fee, but were not permitted to balance bill.
Medigap policies typically have not covered balance bills, so balance bills represent additional out-ofpocket costs to beneficiaries (GAO, 1989; Rice, 1984 Medicare's allowed charge was $100, the physician would receive $80 from Medicare, a $20 copayment from the beneficiary, plus an additional $20 balance bill from the beneficiary.
After the passage of this law, the doctor could not charge the beneficiary for the $20 balance bill. Thus, the physician's total reimbursement for this visit fell by 17% as a result of the policy change and the patient's out-of-pockets costs for the visit fell by 50%.
In 1987, Connecticut, Vermont and Rhode Island implemented mandatory assignment laws that applied to relatively low-income beneficiaries. Based on their income, 68% of Connecticut beneficiaries, 49% of Rhode Island beneficiaries, and 90% of Vermont beneficiaries were eligible for mandatory assignment (GAO, 1989) . Effective January 1, 1990, Rhode Island's mandatory assignment law was expanded to cover all beneficiaries.
Pennsylvania required all doctors to accept assignment, effective September 8, 1990.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (OBRA 89) imposed federal restrictions on balance billing (beginning in 1991) and legislated a new Medicare fee schedule (beginning in 1992). For each procedure/region, there was a "recognized payment amount" for non-participating physicians, which was 95% of the recognized payment amount for participating physicians. There was also a "limiting charge" which was the upper bound on billed charges by non-participating physicians. In 1991, the limiting charge was 125% of the recognized payment amount; this limit decreased to 120% in 1992 and 115% in 1993.
Since the fee for non-participants is 95% of the fee for participants, physicians have effectively been permitted to bill their patients only 9.25% above the Medicare participating physician fee since 1993. New York implemented a more stringent limiting charge of 115% of the recognized payment amount beginning in 1991; New York's limiting charge fell to 110% in 1992. Table 1 provides a summary of the law changes and indicates the share of
Medicare beneficiaries who were impacted by any type of balance billing restriction in each year. Figure 1 shows the average per-beneficiary balance billing liability for each year between 1977 and 1993. As the figure illustrates, average per-beneficiary balance bills were rising through the early 1980s, before beginning a decline that continued through 1993.
Advocates argued that balance billing restrictions would lead to greater access to medical care for the elderly. In particular, they claimed that the elderly would be more likely to obtain necessary medical care if they did not face any uncertainty about out-of-pocket costs. Uncertainty arises from the fact that patients do not always have the option to choose their specialists and from the fact that an individual physician treating an individual patient may choose to accept assignment on one visit, but not on another (GAO, 1989; Physician Payment Review Commission (PPRC), 1988) . In addition, advocates pointed out that roughly half of Medicare beneficiaries did not understand the term "assignment" and approximately three-quarters had not heard of the Participating Physician and Supplier program (GAO, 1989) . Given these facts, advocates argued that it was unreasonable to expect beneficiaries to lower their out-of-pocket costs by finding and using a participating physician. Thus, they predicted that restrictions on balance billing would increase access to care by the elderly.
Opponents argued that, as a form of price ceilings, balance billing restrictions would have the opposite effect, reducing access to care for Medicare beneficiaries. In particular, they suggested that physicians would be less willing to treat Medicare patients and, when balance billing regulations had been enacted in only a few states, physicians might move to states with less restrictive policies (GAO, 1989 behavior. The short length of time between policy implementation and evaluation is a particular concern if we believe that long-run physician responses may be stronger than short-run responses. In this paper, I provide evidence on longer-term responses, using data that extends as far as 10 years beyond the first policy change in Massachusetts.
Theoretical Framework
Modeling the physician as an income-maximizer provides insight into how physicians might respond to restrictions on balance billing. Assume that a physician acts to maximize his income:
(1)
where p is the price charged to "private" (non-Medicare and Medicare non-assigned) patients, Q Priv is the number of "private" (non-Medicare and Medicare non-assigned) patients, f is the Medicare fee, Q Total is the total number of patients, and c is the cost of treating a patient. Note that Q Priv is composed of two distinct groups of patients: nonMedicare patients and Medicare non-assigned patients. When balance billing is incorporated in this model, one of the two groups -the Medicare non-assigned -will be shifted out of Q Priv .
I assume that the cost of seeing patients increases with the number of patients seen, due to actual costs of treatment and the physician's demand for leisure (i.e. dc/dQ Tot >0). I also assume that the private price increases with Medicare fee (i.e. dp/df>0), which reflects the fact that Medicare non-assigned patients are concerned only about their out-of-pocket costs.
If a non-assigned Medicare patient has met his deductible, his net out-of-pocket cost is the standard copayment (20% of the Medicare fee, f) plus the balance bill (p-f). That is, the net price to a non-assigned Medicare patient is p-(0.8*f). Since an increased Medicare fee offsets part of the net out-of-pocket cost, non-assigned Medicare patients are willing to pay higher p to remain at the same level of out-of-pocket cost for any quantity of services. To the extent that the private market is dominated by non-assigned Medicare patients, dp/df may be close to 0.8; to the extent that the private market is dominated by non-Medicare patients, dp/df will be close to zero. Finally, I assume that the physician faces a downward sloping demand curve for private patient care (i.e. dp/dQ Priv <0). This assumption reflects the notion that physicians are monopolistic competitors due to product differentiation.
The physician chooses Q Priv and Q Total to maximize income. The two first-order conditions are:
and:
The first of these conditions, equation (2), indicates that a physician will provide services to private patients until the marginal revenue from an additional private patient
Pr is equal to the marginal revenue (f) from an additional Medicare assigned patient. Rearranging equation (2) yields the elasticity of price with respect to Q Priv :
This equation implies that the elasticity increases with f and decreases with p.
Equation (3) indicates that the physician will provide services to patients until the marginal cost of providing services to an additional patient
is equal to the marginal revenue (f) from providing services to an additional patient. Rearranging this firstorder condition, we have the elasticity of cost with respect to Q Total : Figure 2 , which follows earlier work on Medicare by Mitchell and Cromwell (1982) , Paringer (1982) and Zuckerman and Holahan (1991) , graphically represents the physician's maximization problem. As above, he stops seeing private patients when the marginal revenue from private patients is equal to the marginal revenue of Medicare assigned patients; thus, Q Priv is established at the point where the two marginal revenue curves cross and the price for private patients is set by the demand curve at that point. The point at which the physician stops seeing Medicare assigned patients is given by the intersection of the marginal cost and marginal Medicare revenue curves. It is possible for the physician's marginal cost curve to be sufficiently high that it intersects the private marginal revenue curve at a price above the Medicare marginal revenue curve, as shown in Figure 3 . In such a case, the physician chooses never to treat assigned Medicare patients; his only Medicare patients will be those patients who are willing to be balance-billed.
What does this theoretical framework predict about the effect of restricting balance billing? In the extreme case of banning any balance billing of Medicare beneficiaries, the policy can be viewed as restricting the demand for physician services by private patients at any given price level. Specifically, a ban on balance billing would force the Medicare nonassigned component of Q Priv to join the Medicare assigned patients. This would decrease the demand by private patients and increase the demand by Medicare assigned patients.
Assuming that the physician was previously treating at least some Medicare assigned patients, this change will decrease the number of private patients seen by a physician, without changing the total number of patients seen. In other words, the previously non-assigned Medicare patients will simply become assigned Medicare patients and the overall quantity of care will remain the same. Figure 4 illustrates the change.
If the physician was not previously seeing Medicare assigned patients (but was seeing Medicare non-assigned patients at private-market prices), he may respond to balance billing restrictions by treating fewer patients in total. As shown in Figure 3 , such a physician has a sufficiently steep marginal cost curve that, in the pre-policy period, his marginal cost curve intersected the downward-sloping (private) segment of the marginal revenue curve, rather than the horizontal (Medicare assigned) segment of the marginal revenue curve. After the imposition of balance billing restrictions, he -like other physicians -faces downward shifts in the private demand and private marginal revenue curves; unlike other doctors, he determines Q Total by the intersection of the private marginal revenue and marginal cost curves and, therefore, may decrease Q Total in response to the restrictions.
Implementation of balance billing restrictions in the United States generally occurred in an environment where Medicare fees were falling relative to prices that could be charged to private payers. Indeed, part of the motivation for restricting balance billing was concern that, as the federal government decreased reimbursement rates to physicians, these decreases for physicians would be passed through to Medicare beneficiaries in the form of increases in balance billing. According to the PPRC, Medicare fees in 1991 were 65%, on average, of the prices that private payers and insurance companies were allowing for the same procedures.
This was a decline from 71% just two years earlier (PPRC, 1991) . Figure 5 illustrates the changes that physicians faced when Medicare balance billing restrictions were imposed. In response to the simultaneous decline in Medicare fees and decline in demand for non-assigned Medicare services, this model suggests that physicians would treat fewer "private" patients (and at a lower price) and would treat fewer total patients. Depending on the relative magnitudes of the declines in private demand and in Medicare fees, a physician might increase or decrease the number of assigned Medicare patients that he treats. Thus, the model could provide theoretical support for either the advocates or opponents of balance billing restrictions, depending on the parameters of the model.
One caveat to the preceding model is that it assumes that demand does not constrain the physician's choice of the quantity of services provided. This assumption may be unrealistic, because beneficiaries always face out-of-pocket costs and, therefore, are unlikely to have unlimited demand for physician services. If demand were a constraint in the initial pre-policy equilibrium, restrictions on balance billing could cause demand to expand due to the fact that beneficiaries face decreased out-of-pocket costs of obtaining physician services. As a result, the equilibrium quantity of services provided could increase. This scenario roughly corresponds to the perspective of advocates of the balance billing restriction policies.
The overall insight from the theoretical framework is that the impact of balance billing restrictions is ambiguous. Theoretical work by other authors adds more ambiguities. Several papers point to ways that the simple income-maximizing framework could be modified.
These papers raise substantial questions about the appropriate model of physician behavior, but do not provide a clear consensus on the predicted effects of price controls, in general, or balance billing restrictions, in particular. For example, Feldman and Sloan (1988) and Glazer and McGuire (1993) use models that incorporate both quantity and quality of care as choice variables. Wedig, Mitchell, and Cromwell (1989) highlight the potential issue of income targeting by physicians, which could create a scenario where price controls lead to increases in the quantity and quality of services. In addition, Wedig, Mitchell and Cromwell (1989) , McGuire (2000) , and numerous other authors have discussed the possibility of demand inducement by physicians, which could also cause price controls to lead to increases in quantity or quality of care. In short, theoretical models of physician behavior have raised important issues that increase the ambiguity of the predictions in the previous section. The goal of this paper, therefore, is to provide some empirical evidence about the direction and magnitude of the effect of balance billing restrictions.
Data
For my empirical analysis of the effects of balance billing restrictions, I turn to several survey data sets. Unfortunately, no single data source provides information on out-of-pocket expenditures, quantity of medical care and quality of medical care during the time period that corresponds to balance billing policy changes. As a result, I use three different data sets, each of which provides evidence on an important outcome that may be affected by balance 2) Beneficiaries of the same age and in the same year, but in states that are not affected by restrictions.
The independent variable of interest in the CEX and NHIS regressions is a dummy variable for being in a state and year with a balance billing restriction in place. I control separately for the direct effects of state and year, and rely on the interaction for identification. The basic regression takes the following form: 
Empirical Results

Consumer Expenditure Survey
Summary statistics for the CEX are shown in Table 2 . Simple cross-tabulations of physician services expenditures suggest that Medicare beneficiaries in states and years with balance billing restrictions spent less on physician services than beneficiaries in other states.
Elderly households in states and years with balance billing restrictions spent an average of $43 per quarter on physician services, whereas households in states and years without balance billing restrictions spent an average of $85.
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Regression results provide a more formal confirmation of these suggestive cross-tabulations.
The first set of regression results from the CEX is shown in Table 3 While not shown here, I find that these results are robust to the inclusion of an additional control group, non-elderly households with heads between the ages of 55 and 64, in a triple-difference framework. This specification has the advantage of controlling for secular trends that may affect patterns of medical care. However, the theoretical framework raises the possibility that this additional "unaffected" group may have experienced some changes in medical care utilization due to changes in the Medicare market. For example, the declining Medicare fee, relative to private fees, during this period could have led to an increase in provision of care to the non-elderly. As a practical matter, however, the inclusion of this additional control group has little impact on my main empirical results.
The finding that balance billing restrictions decrease expenditures for physician services by 44% among elderly households raises the issue of the distributional consequences of the restrictions. While these restrictions may have been enacted to protect the elderly from high out-of-pocket medical expenses, they presumably also protected some beneficiaries with high incomes who did not have an obvious need for protection against balance billing restrictions. Table 4 provides evidence on this issue, derived from regressions that interact a dummy variable for "high" income with Restriction st .
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"High" income is defined as any income over $23,145 (in real 1999 dollars), the median for the elderly households in the data set. A significant, negative coefficient on the interaction term would imply that high-income beneficiaries benefited more from the restrictions. The results in Table 4 suggest that highincome households experienced a significantly larger reduction in the level of out-of-pocket physician expenditures. While mean quarterly physician expenditures are higher in highincome households than in low-income households, the reduction in out-of-pocket expenditures as a share of mean expenditures for high-income households (46%) was greater than the reduction for low-income households (36%). However, these findings are not robust to using total medical expenditures as the dependent variable or to the addition of the nonelderly control group. Therefore, overall, I conclude that balance billing restrictions decreased the out-of-pocket liability of elderly households, but did not necessarily benefit high-income elderly households more than low-income households.
National Health Interview Survey
I next turn to the NHIS to determine effects of balance billing restrictions on the quantity of care provided to elderly beneficiaries. Table 5 shows summary statistics and for the possibility that balance billing restrictions decreased the number of visits by no more than 11% and increased the number of visits by no more than 16% relative to the mean. In short, the restrictions do not appear to have affected the quantity of care received by
Medicare beneficiaries but, if they did affect the quantity, the effect was relatively small.
Since Helbing and Petrie (1992) reported wide variation among specialties in balance billing patterns, I next consider the possibility that balance billing restrictions had different impacts on different types of specialties. To capture differential effects by specialty, Table 6 reports results from separate regressions for the number of visits in the past 2 weeks to six different types of physicians. Average 1990 balance billing as a share of the Medicare fee is shown in the last column of the table for each specialty. The results do not suggest that balance billing restrictions affected the quantity of care received, even for physicians with relatively high average balance bills. Table 7 shows summary statistics for the NAMCS sample of doctor visits. The dependent variables in this data set include the duration of the doctor visit, as reported by the physician, and the follow-up plans that were arranged. I interpret these variables as proxies for the quality of care received. The statistics are shown separately for the 55-64 year old control group in column 1, for the 65-75 year-old treatment group in column 2, and the 75 and older treatment group in column 3. The 75 and older patients are excluded from some of the regressions in order to make the treatment and control groups more comparable. As the summary statistics show, excluding the oldest age groups creates a sample that appears to be more homogeneous.
National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey
The identification strategy for the NAMCS differs from the basic regression framework because state identifiers are not available in the NAMCS. In this case, the potential control groups are limited to: While it is not necessarily reasonable to assume that a 55-year-old would have a doctor's appointment of the same length as a 74-year-old, this assumption is more reasonable if the 55-year-old and the 74-year-old are suffering from the same health problem. So, although it is impossible to use geographic variation to identify the impact of balance billing restrictions, the use of age variation is more palatable in the NAMCS, since the data provides detailed information about reasons for physician visits.
The framework for analyzing the effects of balance billing on Medicare beneficiaries in the NAMCS is as follows:
where Y ait measures a dependent variable for doctor visit i provided to a patient in age group a in year t. In this empirical framework, Age65 a is a dummy variable for the patient being aged 65 or older and Post t is a dummy variable for years after 1990. The coefficient of interest is δ, which represents the effect of the patient being older than age 65 in the post-policy, as opposed to the pre-policy, period. X ait is a vector of covariates, which includes the physician's specialty and the primary reason for the patient's visit. The identifying assumption is that, conditional on the reason for a visit and other covariates, there are no differential trends in the dependent variable among the two age groups. An alternative regression, which may reduce concerns about differential trends in the age groups, excludes observations over the age of 74 who are likely to be more different from the 55-64 age group.
Replicating this identification strategy as closely as possible in the CEX yields results that are similar to the results shown in Table 3 . In particular, I use CEX data, but exclude observations in the Northeast and control only for sex, age, race, year and quarter. The effect of the balance billing restrictions is identified using an interaction between a dummy variable for being an elderly household and a dummy variable for being post-1990. The results indicate a statistically significant decline of $23.78 in quarterly expenditures for physician services and a decline of $39.37, significant at the 10% level, in total quarterly expenditures for medical care. The fact that results in the CEX using this alternative identification strategy are similar to results reported in Table 3 , using the preferred geographic identification strategy, suggest that this alternative identification strategy may successfully capture the impact of the balance billing restrictions.
The results in Table 8 do not show substantial evidence of changes in the quality of health care provision. The only significant results indicate that physicians are less likely to arrange a follow-up telephone call for the older age group after 1990. The coefficient of -.006 represents a 20% decline in follow-up phone calls relative to the mean. This result is present in the full sample as well as the younger, more homogeneous sub-sample. The various types of follow-up plans are not mutually exclusive, so it is reasonable that there is no significant offsetting increase in another category of follow-up. This result suggests a small, negative impact on quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries after balance billing restrictions were imposed.
In Table 9 , I take advantage of variation in physician specialty. A physician with higher average pre-policy balance bills may react more strongly to balance billing restrictions than a physician with low balance bills, because the physician with larger pre-policy balance bills would face a larger percentage decline in marginal reimbursement for care to Medicare beneficiaries. To capture this effect, I interact the specialty-specific balance billing rates, based on Helbing and Petrie (1992) , with Age65 it *Post t . The coefficients on these interaction terms are always insignificant but the standard errors are so large that it is impossible to rule out the possibility of large effects. The results in Table 9 are therefore inconclusive. Taken together, the only evidence of changes in care quality from the NAMCS suggests a decrease in follow-up phone calls, but no other apparent reduction in care quality.
Effects on Aggregate Physician Supply
One final and important issue is the general equilibrium effects of balance billing restrictions. The restrictions could have led to a decrease in the supply of physicians through numerous mechanisms, including increases in physician retirement rates, physician migration between states or slowdowns in physician immigration from foreign countries. Opponents of balance billing restrictions suggested that the supply of physicians would, in fact, decline as a result of these policies.
Using aggregate data from numerous editions of the American Medical Association's publication, Physician Characteristics and Distribution, I consider whether there is an impact of balance billing policies on the number of physicians per 1000 residents in a given state. Using data from 1981 to 1993 on the number of doctors of each specialty in each state and year, I test whether the supply of physicians in specialties that historically charged relatively higher balance bills was more likely to decline in states with balance billing restrictions. I interact the balance billing rate of each specialty with Restriction st . The effect of balance billing restrictions is, therefore, identified from the interaction of state, year and physician specialty. The regression model is saturated, with controls for state*year, specialty*year, and state*specialty. Specialties observed include: general surgeons, internists, neurosurgeons, obstetrician-gynecologists, ophthalmologists, orthopedists, pediatricians, plastic surgeons, psychiatrists, radiologists and thoracic surgeons. Of these specialties, pediatricians had the lowest level of balance billing, with an average balance bill that was 4% of the Medicare approved charge in 1990, and anesthesiologists had the highest level of balance billing, with an average balance bill that was 24% of the Medicare approved charge in 1990.
The results in the first column of Table 10 provide little evidence of a decline in the number of doctors per 1,000 residents in high balance billing specialties relative to low balance billing specialties in states and years with restrictions. The results in the second column, which allow for the effect of the restrictions to vary over time, provide some evidence of a decrease in physicians per 1,000 residents, beginning two years after policy implementation, but the coefficient is significant at only the 10% level. It seems reasonable that physician labor supply would respond with a multiple-year lag. The coefficient is not statistically significant, but suggests that a specialty that had average balance bills that were 10% larger as a share of the Medicare allowed charge in 1990 experienced a relative decline of 5 physicians per million residents. Relative to the mean of 105 physicians per million residents, this effect is relatively small.
Policy Endogeneity Concerns and Sensitivity Tests
The possibility of policy endogeneity is a source of concern for my identification strategy. For example, it is possible that balance billing restrictions were first implemented in states that had particular reasons to be concerned about the financial liabilities of their elderly residents or in states where initial assignment rates were sufficiently high that mandatory assignment would be a less binding constraint. Pre-policy assignment rates in states that passed restrictions varied widely, from 58% in Connecticut to 94% in Massachusetts and Rhode Island. However, the mean assignment rate among states that passed restrictions, at 78%, was higher than the national average of 60% (U.S. Congress, 1994) . This fact suggests that balance billing restrictions were less of a constraint in states that first passed restrictions. Consequently, my findings may underestimate the impact of balance billing restrictions in a typical state.
In addition to restricting balance billing, OBRA 89 created the Medicare Fee Schedule, which was implemented in 1992. The new fee schedule changed the level of reimbursement that was received by physicians, depending on their specialties and locations. In general, the Medicare fee changes favored primary care physicians and rural physicians. If these price changes were correlated with changes in balance billing restrictions, my estimates of the impact of balance billing could be biased. In order to address this concern, I test the sensitivity of my empirical results to controlling for the percentage change in Medicare payment rates between 1991 and 1993 by state and by primary care status (U.S. Congress, 1994) . As an additional specification check, I run my regressions without post-1991 data.
My empirical results are not substantively changed by either specification check.
Conclusion
How physicians respond to differential payment rates across different types of patients is an important issue for the design of reimbursement policy. Concerns about physician responses to such differences have arisen in the context of Medicare balance billing restrictions and, more recently, in the context of "concierge physicians," who charge out-ofpocket fees substantially in excess of normal reimbursement limits. Most recently, the New York Times reported that a physician paid a $53,400 settlement to the government for charging Medicare beneficiaries a $600 fee in exchange for extra services, such as round-theclock access to the physician and coordination of care with other providers (Pear, 2004) .
Advocates and opponents have offered divergent views of the implications of charging such fees, with little empirical evidence to substantiate these views. In the historical context of balance billing restrictions, policy advocates felt that restrictions would improve access to care for the elderly, whereas opponents felt that restrictions would hinder access to care.
In this paper, I use variation in the timing of restrictions in different states to identify the impact of balance billing restrictions. I find little empirical evidence that physicians changed their behavior in response to the balance billing restrictions. However, I do find suggestive evidence of a decline in follow-up telephone calls associated with the restrictions.
Overall, these findings do not provide strong support for the views of either the advocates or the opponents of balance billing restrictions. In the context of the recent debate about concierge physicians, these findings suggest that concerns about decreased access to care among individuals who can't afford additional fees may be overstated.
The empirical results do, however, suggest a decline in out-of-pocket spending of roughly $120 per elderly household per year, which amounts to an 8% decline in overall medical spending per household in the data. There is some evidence that the reduction in spending was concentrated among high-income beneficiaries, but this evidence is not robust to alternative specifications. Regardless, this decline in spending represents a transfer from physicians to Medicare patients and the welfare implications of the policy change depend primarily on how this transfer affects the social welfare function Note. Standard errors in parentheses; they are clustered on state and year. Each coefficient is from a different regression and represents the effect of living in a state and year with a balance billing restriction in place. The row label indicates the dependent variable; the column label indicates the specification of the dependent variable. Controls include state, year, state trends, quarter of interview, real income, household size and demographic characteristics (gender, marital status, gender*marital status, age, race and education) of the household head. Households that are income-eligible for Medicaid are excluded from the sample. Columns 1 and 3 are estimated using OLS, column 2 shows marginal effects from Probit models, and column 4 is estimated using median regression. Note. Standard errors in parentheses; they are clustered on state and year. Each coefficient is from a different regression and represents the effect of living in a state and year with a balance billing restriction in place. The row label indicates the dependent variable; the column label indicates the specification of the dependent variable. Controls include state, year, state trends, real income, gender, marital status, gender*marital status, age, race and education. Individuals who are income-eligible for Medicaid are excluded from the sample. Columns 1 and 3 are estimated using OLS, column 2 shows marginal effects from Probit models, and column 4 is estimated using median regression. Column 5 shows specialty-specific average balance billing as a share of the Medicare fee in 1990, as reported in Helbing and Petrie (1992) . Note. Standard errors in parentheses; they are clustered on physician specialty. Each coefficient is from a different regression and represents the effect of being aged 65 or older in a year with a balance billing restriction in place. The row label indicates the dependent variable; the column label indicates the data sample used for the regression. Controls include age, sex, race, region, year, physician specialty and primary reason for visit. Patients with Medicaid as an expected source of payment are not included in the sample. Coefficients in the first row are estimated using OLS; other rows show marginal effects from Probit models. Note. Standard errors in parentheses; they are clustered on physician specialty. Each coefficient is from a different regression. The row label indicates the dependent variable; the column label indicates the data sample used for the regression. Controls include age, sex, race, region, year, physician specialty, primary reason for visit, and interactions between over age 65, post-policy and the Medicare income share. Patients with Medicaid as an expected source of payment are not included in the sample. Coefficients in the first row are estimated using OLS; other rows show marginal effects from Probit models. 
